American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II
Part Two
By Colonel David M. Glantz
Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Postwar American Perspective On Eastern Front Operations
If American wartime impressions of combat on the Eastern Front were vague and imprecise, there was some improvement in that picture during the first decade and a half after war ended. However, during that period a new tendency emerged that colored almost all future works describing events on the Eastern Front. That tendency was to view operations in the East through German eyes and virtually only German eyes. From 1945 to 1958 essentially all works written in English or translated into English about events on the Eastern Front were written by German authors, many of whom were veterans of combat in the East, works moreover, based solely on German sources. #1
This German period of war historiography embraced two genre of works. The first included memoirs written during those years when it was both necessary and sensible to dissociate oneself from Hitler or Hitler's policies. Justifiable or not, the writers of these memoirs did just that and essentially laid blame on Hitler for most strategic, operational, and often tactical failures. Thus, an apologetic tone permeated these works. Officers who shared in the success of Hitler's armies refused to shoulder responsibility for the failures of the same armies. Only further research will judge the correctness of their views.
The first of the postwar memoirs to appear in English was the by now classic work, Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian. Guderian's work, which casts considerable light on strategic and operational decisions while Guderian was a panzer group commander in 1941 and later when he became Chief of Staff in 1944, set the tone for future treatment by German generals of Hitler's leadership. Guderian laid at Hitler's feet principal responsibility for all failures of the German Army and for the dismantling of the German General Staff. The German General Staff was portrayed as both used and abused by Hitler throughout the war. Guderian's message was best conveyed by the chapter heading he chose for the section of the Polish War of 1939 which read, "The Beginning of the Disaster." As in most subsequent works, Guderian included little Soviet operational data.
One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltration, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.
Mellenthln's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11th Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79, while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.
Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin's work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths. #2
Of equal importance to Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level perspective, was the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories. An important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command). Again Soviet superiorities are overstated.
These three basic memoirs dominated historiography of World War II in the 1950's and continue to be treated as authoritative works today even as unexploited archival materials challenge an increasing number of facts cited in the three works. Other works appeared in English during this period but were generally concerned with individual battles or operations. Whether coincidental or not, most of these unfavorable accounts of Soviet combat performance appealed to an American audience conditioned by the Cold War years. Notably, few German commanders of the later war years, a period so unpleasant for German fortunes, wrote memoirs; and the works of those who did (for example, General Heinrici) still remain as untranslated manuscripts in the archives.
The second genre of postwar works included the written monographs based upon debriefings of and studies by German participants in operations on the Eastern Front. For several years after war's end the Historical Division of USEUCOM supervised a project to collect the war experiences of these veterans relating to all wartime fronts. Literally hundreds of manuscripts were assembled on all types of operations. All were written from memory without benefit of archival material. The Department of the Army published the best of these short monographs in a DA pamphlet series in the late forties and early fifties.
These pamphlets were of mixed quality. All were written from the German perspective, and none identified Soviet units involved in the operations. Some were very good, and some were very inaccurate. All require collation with actual archival materials. All are still in use and are considered to be as a valuable guide to Soviet operational tendencies. A few examples should suffice to describe the care that must be employed when using these sources.
In 1950 a DA Pamphlet appeared assessing Allied airborne operations. The distinguished group of German officers who wrote the pamphlet were directed by Major General Hellmuth Reinhardt. The pamphlet critiqued German and Allied airborne experiences. In its chapter on Allied airborne landings in World War II was a subsection entitled, Reflections on the Absence of Russian Air Landings, which began with the following statement:
"It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. . . its wartime operations were confined to a commitment of small units.... for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect."
The study went on to mention a rumored air drop along the Dnieper in 1943 but could provide few details of the drop.
A little over a year later Reinhardt discovered his error and put together another manuscript describing the extensive airborne operations the Soviets conducted within the context of the Moscow counteroffensive and adding details to his description of the abortive Soviet Dnieper airborne drop in 1943. Recently the Office of the Chief of Military History republished the original pamphlet describing the lack of Russian airborne activity. Reinhardt's revised manuscript remains unpublished.
A DA pamphlet entitled German Defensive Tactics against Russian Break-throughs contained similar errors. In a chapter describing a delaying action conducted between 5-24 August 1943 the authors mistakenly stated that German forces abandoned the city of Khar'kov on 18 August when, in fact, the correct date was 23 August. Such errors intermixed with accurate date cast serious doubt on the validity of these works as a whole. Despite these errors, most the pamphlets have been reprinted; and they remain one of the basic sources of data about the Red Army. Moreover, they provided impressions of the characteristics of the Russian soldier which have become an integral part of our current stereotype of the Soviet soldier.
One of the principal deficiencies of all genres of German postwar accounts of fighting on the Eastern Front written during the 1950's was the almost total absence of Soviet operational data. The forces German army groups, armies, corps, and divisions engaged appeared as faceless masses, a monolith of field grey manpower supported by seemingly endless ranks of artillery and, by the end of the war, solid columns of armor.
The facelessness of these Soviet masses, lacking distinguishable units and any individually concerning unit mission or function, reinforced the impression conveyed in these German works that Soviet masses, inflexibly employed in unimaginative fashion, simply ground down German power and finally inundated the more capable and artfully controlled German forces. The Soviet steamroller plod into eastern Europe leaving in its wake endless ranks of dead and wounded.
That psychological and absolutely distorted image of the Soviets portrayed in German works has persisted ever since. Moreover, this panorama of operations against a faceless foe clouds the issue of correlation of forces and enables the writers to claim almost constant overwhelming enemy force superiority, whether or not it really existed. All of these memoirs and pamphlets appeared before German archival materials were available, hence they were written without benefit of the rich archival data on Soviet forces and operational methods found in these wartime archives.
In the 1960's reputable trained historians began producing accounts of action on the Eastern Front. These works were better than the earlier ones but still lacked balance. They were based primarily on German sources but did contain some material on the Soviets obtained from German archival sources. Some were written by individuals who spent considerable time in the Soviet Union during the war.
Alexander Werth drew upon his experiences in the wartime Soviet Union to produce Russia at War and a number of shorter works. Although these writings contained little operational data they did present the Soviet perspective as they focused on the suffering and hardship endured by the Russian people and on the resulting bravery as they overcame those conditions.
Alan Clark's survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more operational detail. However, it still lacked any solid body of Soviet data. Moreover Clark displayed a tendency others would adopt - that is to cover the first two years of war in detail but simply skim over events during the last two years of war. In fact, of the 506 page book, over 400 pages concern the earlier period. This reflected an often expressed judgment that there was little reason to study operations late in the war because the machinations of Hitler so perverted the ability of German commanders to conduct normal reasonable operations.
The U.S. Army Center for Military History made a commendable effort to correct this imbalance by publishing Earl Ziemke's work entitled Stalingrad to Berlin. This work, given the available source material, was a sound and scholarly one. Ziemke surveyed operations from November 1942 to the close of war, generally from a strategic and high level operational perspective. While relying on German sources, he based his research on German archival materials and did include material from the, by now, emerging Soviet accounts of operations. In so doing Ziemke expanded the American view of the war in the East and began to dispel some of the more serious errors found in earlier German accounts.
Ziemke and others who followed him with writings on the Eastern Front were helped immeasurable by Soviet historians work on the war – work which began in the late 1950's and accelerated in the 1960's. Those new works, about which I will have more to say later, although of mixed quality, added a new but essential dimension to historiography of the war. Most good historians took cognizance of them in their work. By the 1970's enough of these works existed to provide a more balanced vision of the war.
In the early seventies Paul Carell, a German author writing under a pen name, finished publication of a two volume study of Eastern Front operations entitled Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth. These works, written in appealing journalistic style, contained more German operational detail and tapped numerous accounts by individual German officers and soldiers who served in tactical units. Although Carell's works were heavily German in their perspective, they did contain an increased amount of Soviet materials. Their lively narrative form has made them influential works among the reading public.
In a more scholarly vein, Col. Albert Seaton published two works, The Russo-German War and The Battle of Moscow which projected Ziemke's work down to the tactical level. By exploiting the official records of particular German divisions Seaton added a new dimension to the descriptions of war at the tactical level. Like Carell, Seaton tempered his German perspective somewhat by using data from a limited number of Soviet sources.
The works of John Erickson have been the most influential ones to appear since 1960. They have broken the stranglehold which the German perspective had over Eastern Front historiography and have integrated into that historiography a comprehensive description of the Soviet perspective on the war, particularly at the strategic and operational levels. His first work, the Soviet High Command, for the first time shed light on the events of the summer of 1941. His subsequent two books, The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to Berlin, recounted in considerable detail the course of war from June 1941 to May 1945. The principal value of these works derives from the fact that they distill information from literally thousands of Soviet works on the war and create from that information a detailed, sometimes frenetic, account of operations in the East. The overwhelming impact of the narrative on the reader reflects the overwhelming scale and scope of war in the East.
Erickson's works critically assess the Soviet sources and reject those that conflict with the most influential and accurate German records. The magnitude of Erickson's research efforts precluded his checking on the accuracy of every tactical detail found in Soviet accounts. Therefore, in some instances, Erickson's details do conflict with reputable German accounts. In addition, Erickson has accepted Soviet data concerning correlation of forces which, in some instances, have been inflated, in particular regarding German strength. Dispute these minor faults Erickson's effort to produce a Soviet view of the war has accomplished the major feat of providing readers with more balanced sources upon which to reach judgments concerning combat in the East. Unfortunately the size and complexity of Erickson's works precludes their appeal to a broad readership among the general public. Future historians will have the task of integrating Erickson's view with those of the host of other memoir writers and historians who wrote from the German perspective.
Across the span of time from 1945 to the present, despite the work of Erickson and a few others, the German view of war on the Eastern Front has predominated. In part, this has resulted from a natural American parochialism that tended to discount or ignore the importance of operations in the East in the overall scheme of war. During the earlier postwar period the German view prevailed by default. Numerous German accounts appeared, and nothing in the way of Soviet material appeared to contradict them. By the 1960's, when Soviet accounts began to appear, the German view was firmly entrenched. Moreover, the cold war atmosphere often prompted out of hand rejection of the Soviet version of war. The German view, sometimes accurate, often apologetic or accusative, and usually anti-Soviet, prevailed. As a result, this view was incorporated into high school and college textbooks and into the curriculum of U.S. military educational institutions. Most important, it provided a context within which to judge the contemporary Soviet military. Only today is that view increasingly being challenged. Those challenges are made possible by intensified Soviet publication efforts, efforts that are slowly raising from obscurity details of Soviet operations on the Eastern Front. These Soviet publication efforts, however, must overcome serious barriers if they are to produce a view which can complement the German perspective and produce a more balanced picture of war on the Eastern Front.
LEST WE FORGET THE IMMORTAL FEATS OF OUR FOREBEARS
FOOTNOTES and SOURCES
#1 Colonel David M. Glantz,
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the United States of America.
This paper was prepared for delivery at the first Soviet-American collegium on the problems of World War II history, held in Moscow on 21-23 October 1986. Thereafter the article was published in the August 1987 issue of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Journal Voprosy Istorii [Questions of History].
Original source: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm
#2 45 footnotes made by Col. Glantz are being omitted here. They are available on the original website publication at the URL given above. The Army's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) is a research and analysis center under the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (TRADOC DCSINT). FMSO manages and operates the Ft. Leavenworth Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC).
SITE MAP
† HOME – Dedicated to the Blessed Memory of those millions of valiant men, women, children and old
people who gave their lives in the sacred fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland during the Great Patriotic War in 1941 – 1945.
† Germany harps on Communist crimes to hush up Nazi Atrocities, says Wehrmacht's war veteran.
† PATRIARCH – Message by His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia on the occasion of the
60th Anniversary of the Glorious Victory in the Great Patriotic War † A unique photo of the Patriarch inside the sanctum sanctorum of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral, Moscow
† GLANTZ - 1 – American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II
by Colonel David M. Glantz, Part One
† GLANTZ - 2
† GLANTZ - 3 – Soviet Sources on Eastern Front operations: Perceptions and Reality
by Colonel David M. Glantz, Part Three
† BALTIC – Russia's Baltic policy before World War Two: the Baltic Lands resumed, by Dr. Valentin Falin † An impressive picture: Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Klim Voroshilov in the Kremlin, Moscow, 1938. How to secure the defense of the Motherland, that was the principal concern at the time. As always...
† BARBAROSSA – 1941: Year of the Truth. Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, by Dr. Valentin Falin
† The glorious defense of the Fortress of Brest
† WHY NOT 1943? – The War could have ended in 1943: The wiles of the West,
by Dr. Valentin Falin
† DYKMAN – The Soviet Experience in World War Two: The numbers, the savagery, the differencies between
the war in the East and the West, by J.T. Dykman, the Eisenhower Institute, Washington, D.C.
† WINTER – General Frost: Fighting the Russians in Winter,
by Allen F. Chew, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
"The Russian winter defeated Napoleon, as every Frenchman knows. It also defeated Hitler, as most Germans know. Many Americans share that "knowledge" which is false in both cases! Those popular myths illustrate the uncritical acceptance and perpetuation of rationalizations designed to obscure the fact that those "invincible" Western military paragons were humbled by the 'inferior' Russians"
† APPEAL – The most important appeal to the Nation: Stalin's Radio Address, Moscow, 3rd July 1941
"Comrades!
Citizens!
Brothers and sisters!
Men of our Army and Navy! My words are addressed to you, my dear friends!"
† WARLORD – The Supreme Commander-in-Chief: Stalin as Warlord,
by Prof. Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College
† YALTA – The Crimean Conference: A Chance the World Missed, by Dr. Valentin Falin and Victor Litovkin
† CHURCHILL – On the Question of Poland: Statement by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons, 27th February 1945 † The Curzon Line
† VICTORY – The Great Victory in May 1945
The hard-won Victory was achieved by the Soviet Union's "Red Army which tore the guts out of the German Army", as Churchill admitted, in glorious military alliance with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America, over the juggernaut of the so-called Axis: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Militarist Japan, and their satellites: Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and Bulgaria. The Axis states were supported by all the manpower, industry and resources of almost all Continental Europe, North Africa, and South-East Asia under their control.
† Stalin's Orders. Profusely illustrated. The VICTORY webpage also features a unique picture which was never before posted on the Internet: Captive German military banners and standards flung down in dishonour at the Victors' feet after the Great Victory Parade on the Red Square in Moscow on the 24th of June 1945
† FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions
The Body Count and GULAG † The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Curzon Line and the so-called 4th partition of Poland
WHO WAS STALIN? A World-Known Anti-Soviet Dissident and a Former Rabid Anti-Stalinist Has Said His Say
Click: ALEXANDER ZINOVIEV – "Even a Donkey Can Kick a Dead Lion"
Prof. Grover Furr About Marshal Stalin and his denigrators
This article is a real MUST READ
for anybody who seek for the truth about the Russian Soul
RUSSIA IS A SUPERPOWER – WHETHER YOU LIKE IT OR NOT
GENOCIDE IN SOUTH OSSETIA IS STOPPED!
Russian armored column is rushing to stop the genocide in South Ossetia
SAVED!
A South Ossetian military man holds a child as he looks at
an armored Russian column arrived to save them from Georgian assault
A PATH TO PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS
By Mikhail Gorbachev, 12 August 2008 The Washington Post
MOSCOW - The past week's events in South Ossetia are bound to shock and pain anyone. Already, thousands of people have died, tens of thousands have been turned into refugees, and towns and villages lie in ruins. Nothing can justify this loss of life and destruction. It is a warning to all.
The roots of this tragedy lie in the decision of Georgia's separatist leaders in 1991 to abolish South Ossetian autonomy. This turned out to be a time bomb for Georgia's territorial integrity. Each time successive Georgian leaders tried to impose their will by force – both in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, where the issues of autonomy are similar – it only made the situation worse. New wounds aggravated old injuries.
Nevertheless, it was still possible to find a political solution. For some time, relative calm was maintained in South Ossetia. The peacekeeping force composed of Russians, Georgians and Ossetians fulfilled its mission, and ordinary Ossetians and Georgians, who live close to each other, found at least some common ground.
Through all these years, Russia has continued to recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. Clearly, the only way to solve the South Ossetian problem on that basis is through peaceful means. Indeed, in a civilized world, there is no other way.
The Georgian leadership flouted this key principle.
What happened on the night of 7th August 2008 is beyond comprehension. The Georgian military attacked the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinval with multiple rocket launchers designed to devastate large areas. Russia had to respond. To accuse it of aggression against "small, defenseless Georgia" is not just hypocritical but shows a lack of humanity.
Mounting a military assault against innocents was a reckless decision whose tragic consequences, for thousands of people of different nationalities, are now clear. The Georgian leadership could do this only with the perceived support and encouragement of a much more powerful force. Georgian armed forces were trained by hundreds of U.S. instructors, and its sophisticated military equipment was bought in a number of countries. This, coupled with the promise of NATO membership, emboldened Georgian leaders into thinking that they could get away with a "blitzkrieg" in South Ossetia.
In other words, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was expecting unconditional support from the West, and the West had given him reason to think he would have it. Now that the Georgian military assault has been routed, both the Georgian government and its supporters should rethink their position.
Hostilities must cease as soon as possible, and urgent steps must be taken to help the victims – the humanitarian catastrophe, regretfully, received very little coverage in Western media this weekend - and to rebuild the devastated towns and villages. It is equally important to start thinking about ways to solve the underlying problem, which is among the most painful and challenging issues in the Caucasus – a region that should be approached with the greatest care.
When the problems of South Ossetia and Abkhazia first flared up, I proposed that they be settled through a federation that would grant broad autonomy to the two republics. This idea was dismissed, particularly by the Georgians. Attitudes gradually shifted, but after last week, it will be much more difficult to strike a deal even on such a basis.
Old grievances are a heavy burden. Healing is a long process that requires patience and dialogue, with non-use of force an indispensable precondition. It took decades to bring to an end similar conflicts in Europe and elsewhere, and other long-standing issues are still smoldering. In addition to patience, this situation requires wisdom.
Small nations of the Caucasus do have a history of living together. It has been demonstrated that a lasting peace is possible, that tolerance and cooperation can create conditions for normal life and development. Nothing is more important than that.
The region's political leaders need to realize this. Instead of flexing military muscle, they should devote their efforts to building the groundwork for durable peace.
Over the past few days, some Western nations have taken positions, particularly in the U.N. Security Council, that have been far from balanced. As a result, the Security Council was not able to act effectively from the very start of this conflict. By declaring the Caucasus, a region that is thousands of miles from the American continent, a sphere of its "national interest," the United States made a serious blunder. Of course, peace in the Caucasus is in everyone's interest. But it is simply common sense to recognize that Russia is rooted there by common geography and centuries of history. Russia is not seeking territorial expansion, but it has legitimate interests in this region.
The international community's long-term aim could be to create a sub-regional system of security and cooperation that would make any provocation, and the very possibility of crises such as this one, impossible. Building this type of system would be challenging and could only be accomplished with the cooperation of the region's countries themselves. Nations outside the region could perhaps help, too – but only if they take a fair and objective stance. A lesson from recent events is that geopolitical games are dangerous anywhere, not just in the Caucasus.
The writer was the last president of the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 and is president of the Gorbachev Foundation, a Moscow think tank.
RUSSIAN BEAR WILL GROWL THEN BITE DEADLY – IF PROVOKED
Well what did else the West expect? Any self-respecting bear will growl first as a sign to ward of attackers, then pounce and maul them if provoked sufficiently.
Remember the dire fate of Napoleon, Hitler, and all the other bloody murderous scum who dared to insult Holy Russia.
The Russian Bear is confident and proud and looking more for respect in international affairs rather than a fight. But we Russians are always ready to make mincemeat of any aggressor.
With 4,237 strategic Russian warheads, approximately 2,000-3,000 operational tactical warheads, and approximately 8,000-10,000 stockpiled strategic and tactical warheads Holy Russia is being remarkably well equipped to defend herself and her allies.
RUSSIA IS A SUPERPOWER – WHETHER YOU LIKE IT OR NOT!
Some say we are five minutes to a new Cold War
This is a false assertion
In fact, with the NATO Navy entering the Black Sea
THE WORLD IS ONE MINUTE TO A THERMO-NUCLEAR WAR
It is incredible!
HOMELESS CHILDREN IN AMERICA
It is incredible for any Russian like myself
to learn about poor homeless people in the West,
and especially about homeless children in America
because formerly we used to consider the USA to be
the wealthiest and happiest country in the world
Obviously, we were wrong in thinking thusly
Friends, I must admit that despite being myself
quite a hardy, tough, and experienced man, as I am
nevertheless
I could not hold back my bitter tears
when I was watching this
extremely heartbreaking video
Click on the picture to watch it yourself
No true Christian can ever watch this video
without tears in the eyes!
Now, you will have to realize
why we Russians love and esteem Stalin:
This is because
Stalin denied the Soviet children
the "freedom" to be homeless
he denied all of us the "freedom"
to sleep and perish in the street
as in America
IN THE SOVIET UNION
NO ONE HAD THE "RIGHT"
EITHER TO BE HOMELESS, OR UNEMPLOYED
OR TO LIVE AND DIE IN THE STREET
HELPLESS AND ABANDONED
AS IN AMERICA
ALL OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE
WERE DENIED SUCH WESTERN "HUMAN RIGHTS"
BY THE STALIN'S REGIME
In this regard I suggest that
you should have a look at the shrewd observations
by an American expat now living in Russia:
click HERE
IS THE WEST HELL?
NO, IT IS NOT HELL
THE WEST IS TERRIBLE HELL
With all its benignity and peoples' fraternity
inasmuch as the former Soviet Union used to serve
so today's Russia continues to serve as an open rebuke
to the Western infernally inhuman and godless way of life
And this is the only true reason
why Russia has been hated, defamed and reviled so much
by the West's ruling class and the media under their control
No wonder!
ARE YOU READY FOR NUCLEAR WAR?
The Mindlessness is Total
By Paul Craig Roberts, August 19 2008
Nothing real issues from the American press, which is about demonizing Russia and Iran, about the vice presidential choices as if it matters, about whether Obama being on vacation let McCain score too many points.
The mindlessness of the news reflects the mindlessness of the government, for which it is a spokesperson.
The American media do not serve American democracy or American interests. They serve the few people who exercise power.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the US and Israel made a run at controlling Russia and the former constituent parts of its empire. For awhile the US and Israel succeeded, but Putin put a stop to it.
Recognizing that the US had no intention of keeping any of the agreements it had made with Gorbachev, Putin directed the Russian military budget to upgrading the Russian nuclear deterrent. Consequently, the Russian army and air force lack the smart weapons and electronics of the US military.
When the Russian army went into Georgia to rescue the Russians in South Ossetia from the destruction being inflicted upon them by the American puppet Saakashvili, the Russians made it clear that if they were opposed by American troops with smart weapons, they would deal with the threat with tactical nuclear weapons.
The Americans were the first to announce preemptive nuclear attack as their permissible war doctrine. Now the Russians have announced the tactical use of nuclear weapons as their response to American smart weapons.
It is obvious that American foreign policy, with its goal of ringing Russia with US military bases, is leading directly to nuclear war. Every American needs to realize this fact. The US government’s insane hegemonic foreign policy is a direct threat to life on the planet.
Russia has made no threats against America. The post-Soviet Russian government has sought to cooperate with the US and Europe. Russia has made it clear over and over that it is prepared to obey international law and treaties. It is the Americans who have thrown international law and treaties into the trash can, not the Russians.
In order to keep the billions of dollars in profits flowing to its contributors in the US military-security complex, the Bush Regime has rekindled the cold war. As American living standards decline and the prospects for university graduates deteriorate, "our" leaders in Washington commit us to a hundred years of war.
If you desire to be poor, oppressed, and eventually vaporized in a nuclear war, vote Republican.
This is the final part of an article by P. C. Roberts.
Warning
This video contains images depicting the reality and horror
of war/violence and should only be viewed by a mature audience
with their nerves of steel
Massacre Caught on Tape: US Military Confirms Authenticity of Their Own Chilling Video Showing Killing of Journalists
One of the men on the ground, believed to be Chmagh, is seen wounded and trying to crawl to safety. One of the helicopter crew is heard wishing for the man to reach for a gun, even though there is none visible nearby, so he has the pretext for opening fire: "All you gotta do is pick up a weapon." A van draws up next to the wounded man and Iraqis climb out. They are unarmed and start to carry the victim to the vehicle in what would appear to be an attempt to get him to hospital. One of the helicopters opens fire with armour-piercing shells. "Look at that. Right through the windshield," says one of the crew. Another responds with a laugh.
Sitting behind the windscreen were two children who were wounded.
O Holy Father, heavenly Physician of our body and soul, Who hath sent Thine only-begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ to heal ailments and deliver us from death, do Thou heal Thy servant Anthony of all suffering and restore him to health by the grace of Thy Divine Son, through the prayers of our Most Holy Queen, Ever Virgin Mary, Mother of God, and of all the Saints; for Thou art the fountain of all cures. O Lord, and we render Thee thanks, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, now and ever, and unto ages of ages. Amen.
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